di Paolo Savarese*
The paper revisits, tracing it back to Kant, the link between the acknowledgement of human dignity and the fundamental human rights that formed the basis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, considers some authoritative objections and questions the possibility of thinking about a logic of rights. The tension between principles and protections cannot be resolved by reducing rights to a legal technique, even if it is qualified, since translating rights into guarantees is implicit and required by that acknowledgement claimed by Kant. This suggests a specific logic of human rights which, however, remains uncertain if it is based on mere general consensus. This logic must be searched for and deepened starting from the conditions of possibility to demand the acknowledgement of one’s own dignity and to transpose them into essential requirements of the construction of legal-political systems.
*Paolo Savarese, Professore ordinario di Filosofia del diritto IUS/20, Università degli Studi di Teramo. Email: firstname.lastname@example.org